Kant\u27s Ostensible Anti-thesis of  Public  and  Private  and the Subversion of the Language of Authority in \u27An Answer to the Question:  What is Enlightenment? by Royal, Michael D.
KANT's OSTENSIBLE ANTITHESIS OF "PUBLIC" AND "PRIVATE" AND 

THE SUBVERSION OF THE LANGUAGE OF AUTHORITY IN U AN ANSWER 

TO THE QUESTION: .IWHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT?'" 




In U An Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?',"1 
written in1784, Kant brought to the table of philosophical discourse 
what previously had been merely a political concern - the manner in 
which enlightenment ought to proceed (Schmidt, "The Question" 
270). His essay was one of tw02 historically significant responses to 
Protestant clergyman Johann Friedrich Zollner's query, posed in a 
footnote of an essay in the Berlinische Monatsschrif. "What is enlight­
enment? This question, which is almost as important as [the ques­
tion] What is truth? would seem to require an answer, before one 
engages in enlightening other people ... ./1 (qtd. in Bahr 1-2). 
The topic of social enlightenment was widely debated as Europe 
searched· for a scientific identity, one which Kant was willing to 
supply withwhathecalledhis own "Copernicanrevolution." Kant's 
line of reasoning in "What Is Enlightenment?/I is different and more 
compelling than those of his contemporaries in that Kant not only 
proposes bothdefinitionofandmethodforenlightenment, butconjoins 
the two in an intimate relationship, the essential link between them 
being free speech, but (as we will see) a qualified kind of free speech 
termed If the public use of reason./I Consequently, Kant's argument 
is political in its aim but philosophical in its approach, appealing to 
the nature of the polis itself, the nature of historical progress, and the 
nature of reason. As such, its implications are deep and far-reaching. 
In this critique of "What Is Enlightenment?" I am not concerned with 
Kant's conclusion, that free speech is necessary for social enlighten­
ment, but only with evaluating the structure of the arguml?l1t and its 
epistemological underpinnings which are both presupposed and 
recommended in the language of the essay. I intend to show that 
Kant is making a political argument that is built around his manipu­
lation of the grammatical relationship between "public" and "pri­
vate." 
Royal is a 1999 graduate of Wheaton College in Illinois where he majored in 
Philosophy and English. 
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I. The Public and Private Uses ofReason 
Kant offers us 1/ the public use of reason" as an object for our 
contemplation and proceeds to argue that this thing, by nature, is 
free. Kant's argument depends on the way he distinguishes the 
public from the private use of reason. He defines the private use of 
reason as II that use whichone makes of his reason ina certain civil post 
or office which is entrusted to him." Kant provides three examples 
in which one operates by the private use of reason: the military officer 
onduty must obey the command of his superior, the citizen must pay 
the taxes imposed on him, and the clergyman must preach IIaccord­
ing to the symbol of the church which he serves" (Kant, IfAnAnswer" 
60). Before we get to Kant's definition of the public use of reason, it 
is worth noting that although the distinction between "public" and 
"private" is strange if not counter-intuitive, Kant is to some degree 
warranted in his application of these terms. John Laursen shows the 
etymological grounds for Kant's uses of these words. The German 
word for "private" reflects its Latin heritage in that, after Cicero, 
privatum acquired a legal meaning, denoting the duty that an indi­
vidual has to another entity by way of a contract or wilt versus, more 
generally, "public" or state law (Laursen, "The Subversive Kant" 
254). Thus, the emphasis on duty is reflected in Kant's use of the 
word "private" in "the private use of reason" - the private use of 
reason has as its job the duty to serve someone else or some other 
entity. The private use of reason is employed in cases in which a 
person's position,like a contract, obliges him to do certain things: for 
example, the military officer is obligated, because of his position in 
. the military, to obey the command of his superior. 
The public use of reason Kant defines as iI that use which anyone 
makes of it [reason] as a scholar [Gelehter] before the entire public of 
the reading world." In the public role one may raise criticism about 
those institutions or practices to which one is bound in one's private 
role: the officer criticizes the military; the citizen, the government; 
and the clergyman, religious and ecclesiastical affairs (Kant, IIAn 
Answer" 60). The Latin term publicus, the meaning from which the 
German adjective offentlich ("public") is derived, was associated with 
both (1) the idea of the state or government, and (2) the notion of" that 
which is out in the open." In the Middle Ages offentlicTJ held more the 
latter of these connotations, but legal scholarship in Germany be­
tween the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries strengthened the prior 
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connotation (Laursen, liThe Subversive Kant" 254). It is in this sense 
that we call a government building a public building, notnecessarily 
because it has public access, but because it is owned by the state 
(Habermas 1-2). Kant's employment of the term "public" with 
reference to that which the scholar brings"out into the open" was a 
kind of reversal of the prevailing usage of the times but was not 
completely unwarranted since lithe wider meaning of 'public' had 
not died out entirely. II (Laursen, liThe Subversive Kant" 255). 
II. Kant's Grammatical Error in His Uses of"Public" and "Private" 
A. The Grammar of'Opposition' 
Despite the etymological roots from which Kant derives mean­
ings for "public" and "private," his distinction is counter-intuitive. 
One would not typically describe something which is regulated by 
government as private, but that is what Kant does with the phrase 
lithe private use of reason." However, I am arguing with John 
Laursen againstthe position that some have taken: that Kantexhibits 
in his distinction an exact reversal of the words IIpublic" and IIpri_ 
vate." The different uses of the words "public" and IIprivate" 
demonstrate that the counter-intuitive character of Kant's distinc­
tion is not the result of a definitional problem, but rather the result of 
a grammatical confusion (I mean "grammatical" in a broadly 
Wittgensteinian sense, Le., a word has a grammar, meaning it is used 
in certain contexts in certain ways and not others). 
John Laursen has argued for a subversive interpretationof KantJ, 
and to continue in the vein of his reading of the essay, I shall attempt 
to elucidate the grammatical mechanism itself which makes possible 
the subversive conceptual recommendations which follow from it. 
First, it is important to recognize that the words "public" and 
"private" share a grammatical feature which, we will see, is key to 
Kant's line of reasoning: this feature, we might call, "having an 
opposite" or II opposition." Now, we must take a short break from 
Kant and ask, in a Wittgensteinian spirit, What kind of a concept is 
'opposition'? We find out by looking at how the word /I oppositionll 
is used in ordinary language.4 The concept of opposition has a 
grammar which governs the ordinary use of it in language. Many 
words have opposites. Nouns include "top" vs. "bottom;" preposi­
tions, "inside" vs. "outsidei" verbs, "rise" vs. "fall;" adverbs, "hap­
pily" vs. "sadly;" conjunctions, "therefore" vs. "however;" interjec­
tions, "Yes!" vs. "No!"; and adjectives, "public" vs. "private." Many 
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words do not share this grammatical feature; for example, there is no 
definite opposite for the word "dog." If we were asked to give one 
and we said, "cat," for instance, we might as well have said, "puppy" 
or "enemy." These words might be opposites to "dog" in some 
contexts, but" dog," as such, has no opposite. To offer one is to 
perpetuate the mistaken assumption of the questioner. 
I would like to point out three rules at workin the language-game 
of opposition. First, when two things are opposite to each other, on 
some level they share no common ground. They do not simply have 
generally different meanings or very different meanings, but rather, 
are severed from each other. Thus we cannot properly say that the 
words "food" and"drink" are opposites, for"drink" is contained in 
"food." Secondly, opposites not only lack commonground, butthey 
also have a kind of antagonism toward each other. They face each 
other as ifinadual. Although "hamburger" and"thinking" share no 
common ground, there is nothing about them that makes them 
necessarily opposed to each other - nothing in one which anticipates 
the other. This kind of mutual exclusivity leads us to a third rule: on 
some level, the concept of opposition does presuppose a common 
ground, but a special kind. As we look at the word as it is used in 
ordinary language, we see that relationship is a necessary grmnmati­
cal condition for things to be mutually exclusive, namely n relation­
ship of antagonism, and that common ground nllowflthe opposition 
to make sense. So, the third rule might be stated: It is only with 
respect to the issue about which the words arc being played against 
one another that they share no common ground and are mutually 
. exclusive, but the issue itself is a COmlTIOn ground. For exam pIe, it is 
with respect to temperature that"cold" and "hot" share no common 
ground, butboth have a common ground as descriptions of tempera­
ture. 
Not only do we find the meaning of a word by looking at its use 
in the language, we also find which meaning of a particular word is 
used by looking at its immediate context in a passage. Notice tlmt a 
word like" alive" can have more than one line of oppo3ition. " Alive" 
can be conh'asted with both If inanhna te" and ",kad," two words 
whose grammars are very different. Arid the word I, alive" itself has 
different grammars depending on which of these it· is contrasted 
with. Consider these two statements: "Father is alive, but sand is 
not" (where the understood opposite is "inanimatelJ ), and "Father is 
alive, but mother is not" (where the understood opposite is 1/ deadlt). 
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The second statement may appropriately be accompanied with, for 
example, emotion, special memories, or vehement denials. None of 
these accompaniments are provided for in the grammar of the 
contrast in the first statement. Rather, we might expect some 
scientific explanation or further definition of what a thing must have 
or do to be considered" alive." In this way, we can speak of a line of 
opposition as being the determining factor in the grammar of the 
words being opposed. Like simple concept-words, different lines of 
opposition involving a single word are used in different language­
games. 
B. The Ostensible Antithesis of "Public" and IIPrivate" 
In light of the above sketch we can see how Kant both capitalizes 
onandmanipulates the grammaticalfeatures of opposition in his use 
of the words "public" and "private." For any use of the word 
"public," there is an opposite use ofthe word "private." Butnotethat 
these words are antonyms only in so far as they are being put to use 
in opposite ways in a given context of the language. Kant's sneaki­
ness is in his drawing his purportedly opposite terms "public" and 
"private" from different lines of opposition. (A) For the word 
"public," Kant adopts a usage derived from the "out in the open" 
connotation, but for the word private, he adopts a usage derived 
from the 'Icontractual" connotation. If Kant had obeyed normal 
usage in pairing these words, he would have used either the wOl'd 
"privatell to mean "indoorsl not accessible to the public at large,u or 
the word IIpublic II to mean IIhaving to do with state (public) law and 
not private contracts.1I In either of these cases, the pair of words 
would have been equal and opposite, so to speak. (B) By identifying 
"private" with its contractual 'Iduty" connotation, Kant can then 
exploit the fact that religious as well as military and legal affairs 
operated (in his time) under the auspices of the state, thus contracting 
the private use of reason to governmental control. So it is in one's 
private military, citizenry, or religious role that one must stTictly 
obey the state authority despite the fact that the idea of'state' would 
not ordinarily have been a connotation of the word "private." (C) 
Thus, Kant suggests an identity between one use of the word "pri­
vatelf and one use of the word "public,'1 which happen to be oppo­
sites. 
The result is that we have the two meanings of "publicll set 
against each other as if they were opposite. What had been merely 
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a dual meaning of one word, "public," Kant made into an (apparent) 
antagonism by giving one of those meanings the name which was 
already, on the surface, opposite to it, Le.," private." Because the two 
meanings of the word "public" are not, infact, opposite to each other, 
the opposition that Kant suggests exists between his words 1/ public" 
and 1/private" is an illusion based merely on the ostensible antithesis 
between those words. 
To summarize, the pair "public" and"private" contains two lines 
of opposition. Kant makes a grammatical error in his uses of the 
words "public" and "private" by confounding these lines of opposi­
tion, joining the two words in a single context as if their meanings 
were commensura te, when, infact, their grammars are different. The 
evidence of this error is seen in the mistaken opposition between 
"scholar" and 1/citizen" or between "reading world" and 1/ civil post." 
Like "public use of reason" and 1/ private use of reason" the words in 
these pairs share no common ground which they can divide up into 
mutually exclusive parts, distinguishing themselves from each other 
in a characteristically opposite way. 
Now the question: So what? The significance of the ostensible 
antithesis is that, on a general level, it gives the false illusion that the 
spheres of activity to which the words "public" and "private'l refer 
are as mutually exclusive as the words themselves, and, more 
specifically, it gives the false illusion that the private use of reason is 
by nature bound to an authoritative (ecclesiastical or governmental) 
Other, while the public use ofreason is by nature free. Thus, Kant's 
political agenda hinges on his manipulation of the grammatical 
feature of opposition in "public" and "private." 
III. Redefining the Authority Structure 
A. Hamann's Critique 
Johann Georg Hamann, friend and critic of Kant, wrote in a letter 
to Christian J aco b Kraus a sharp review of 1/ Wha t Is Enlightenment?" 
Hewas one of the first to make a criticism of Kant' s distinction which 
would be repeated by many: If the public and private uses of reason 
are separate, the public use being free while the private use is 
controlled, the free public use of reason can do nothing to relieve 
whatever societal oppression is being suffered unsier an absolutist 
government. At some point, the people must be empowered to use 
more compelling, practical means to help themselves than just 
words. HamaIUl writes, " ... the public use of reason & freedom is 
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nothing but a dessert, a sumptuous dessert. The private use is the 
daily bread that we should give up for its sake" (148). "What good to 
me/' he asks, "is the festive garment of freedom when I am in a slave's 
smock at home?"5 
At first blush, Kant's distinction does seem to welcome a passiv­
ist interpretation. Kant supports the state's and church's claim to 
authority throughoutthe essay, evenpraising the Frederick's "large, 
well-disciplined army as a garuntee of public peace" (63). Kant's 
argument for the freedom of the public use of reason is presented as 
greatly beneficial to the interests of the throne. The free, public use 
of reason can only help the government and is not a threat. As if 
addressing Frederick himself, Kant employs reassuring words say­
ing that the free public use of reason is "harmless" (59); it works 
without "harming the affairs" of the private sphere (60); it is some­
thing to "have little fear from" (62); and it presents fIno danger" (63). 
"For this enlightenment, Kant writes, " ... nothing more is required 
thanfreedom; and indeed the most harmless form of all the things that 
may be called freedom: namely, the freedom to make a public use of 
one's reason in all matters" ("An Answer" 59). The public use of 
reason is harmless because it is separated from the duty every citizen 
has to obey the government in his private role, for in his private role, 
the citizen is "part of the machine" (60). 
But we ought to take issue with the view that, in Kant's scheme, 
the"private sphere," as James Schmidt puts it, " could remain undis­
turbed by the 'innocuous' freedom of an umestricted public use of 
reason ..." ("What Enlightenment Was" 99). The public use ofreason 
would disturb the relationship between the people and the governing 
authorities and at the same time leave them unharmed. Though the 
effects of the free, public use of reason may be harmful to the stability 
of Frederick's structure of authority, they would be considered 
improvements by the truly enlightened government of a mature 
society. For such a status is required for anyone who would judge 
what is good for society. Note that Kant remarks that his is not yet 
an enlightened age, but an age coming to enlightenment. How can 
Kant presume to appeal to the hypothetical judgment of the mature 
mind of an enlightened government? We will come back to this in a 
moment. 
The fact is, Kant equivocates on the phrase "use of reason." It is 
not a constant of which "public" and "private" are two variations. 
Kant draws his publicI private line of distinction in order to alter his 
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reader's conception of the nature of those spheres which it separates, 
and the public and private uses of reason are not two uses of the same 
thing, namely reason, but two altogether different things. There is 
one use of reason, and that is the public use of reason. To Kant, 
U Reason depends on ... freedom [of inquiry] for its very existence" 
(qtd. in Laursen, "Scepticism" 449). For Kant, reason is by nature 
free, objective, scientific, self-legislative, truth-seeking, active, and 
above all, autonomous (Schmidtr "What Enlightenment Was" 93). 
Kant's typical Enlightenment view of true reason is that it is 
purified of prejudice. Prejudice comes about by its being taught; 
thus, to purify oneself from prejudice, one must not take for granted 
what one is told, but rather use one's own, autonomous faculty of 
reason to find truth. The opening lines of Kant's essay read, Enlight­
enment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturi ty. Immaturity is 
the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance 
of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the lack 
of understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution and the 
courage to use it without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! 
[IIDare to know!"] Have courage to use your own understanding! is 
thus the motto of enlightenment. (Kant, "Answer," 58) 
The notions of privateness and duty are foreign to this descrip­
tion of reason. How much reasoning, we might ask, does it really 
take to pay one's taxes? The point, it is clear, is not to reason about 
it in the private role, but just to pay them. What Kant calls "the 
private use ofreason" amounts to no more than passive subservience 
to an authoritative Other. It is a surrendering of one's ability to 
properI y reason at all. The motto which Kan t commends to Frederick 
is, "Argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, but 
obey!" (Kant, "An Answer" 59). This sentence, which pictures the 
division between the public and private uses of reason, makes plain 
the incommensurateness of the words "private" and "reason." To 
the degree that true reasoning is autonomous, the "private use of 
reason," under the auspices of a regulating Other, is not a use of 
reason at all. In fact, Kant's description of the private use of reason 
matches his description of those things which reason must correct­
opinion, prejudice, superstition. The whole of the private sphere, 
then, is not one concerned with truth. It is concerned with, as 
Hamann puts it, "the daily bread" - the practical matters of living 
(148). Only the public sphere deals with truth. 
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B. The Reversal of Hamann's Critique: Kant's Appeal to His Own 
Reason 
So, to return to our question from above, how can Kant presume 
to appeal to the mind ofan enlightened government? He is, I believe, 
appealing to his own, autonomous reason. For he is one of the few 
who has II thrown off the yoke of immaturity," and, as such, is able to 
reason without prejudice (59). He is a representative of the enlight­
ened age, and he assumes the privileged place of judge over all 
authorities by virtue of his own ability to reason. Furthermore, he is 
enacting the free, public use of reason in the very essay in which he 
espouses it, and thefreedom of expression in his essay is proportion­
ate to the political freedom that the public use of reason has attained 
in his not-yet-but-becoming "enlightened age." 
Because of the way Kant's ostensible antithesis of "public" and 
"private" capitalizes on the grammatical features of separation and 
antagonism in opposition, but neglects that of having a common 
ground, the publiciprivate distinction serves as a redefinition of the 
authority structure. Kant uses the antithesis like a balance. What­
ever concept Kant predicates on the private sphere, the opposite 
automatically accrues to the public sphere. The more Kant binds the 
private use of reason to the authority, the more he frees the public use 
from it. But the public and private spheres are tiered, not equal, in 
their opposition. The more private and practical the private sphere 
is, the more control government has but the less it deals with truth. 
Hence, the degree of privateness in the private sphere is proportiori­
ate to the degree that the private sphere needs the public sphere as its 
authority. 
Hamann's critique, that the public use of reason is worthless for 
having no affect on the private sphere is reversed by the fact that 
goverrunent, as the embodiment of the private sphere, is itselfobliged 
to an authority, and that authority is none other than reason, of the 
free, public variety (the agents of which include Kant). The state, 
which is charged with the care of its people, is bound, obligated in its 
own right, to the ultimate guiding principle and authority: the Truth 
of reason. It must then, by duty, grant freedom to the public use of 
reason and accept the guidance of it. If the government is the 
embodiment of the private sphere, Kant is the symbol of the public 
sphere. As a philosopher, he himself is bound by private obligation 
to serve the state by freely reasoning to inform the state on how it 
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should be run (Laursen, "Subversive" 261-2). The philosopher's 
private use of reason is his public use of reason6• Consequently, the 
authority is only an authority in a qualified way.7 According to 
Kant's scheme, it is perfectly reasonable for one, in the private role, 
to completely submit to the authority. This is a direct appeal to the 
interests of Frederick and his government, but notice that even in this 
appeat it is reason that gives the authority its authority. 
If Kant can make people speak the way he speaks in "What Is 
Enlightenment?" he has done something to subvert the language of 
absolutism, as Laursen puts it ("The Subversive Kant" 253). The 
public/private division is a division between truth (discovered by 
pure reason) and practical affairs, and the private sphere, or the 
practical matters of governing the nation, must be subsumed itself 
under the governance of the public sphere for the same reason that 
human action must be directed by a human mind. The greatest 
changes occur during revolution, but they only last if they are 
accompanied by a fundamental shift in a people's way of thinking. 
Kant shows his cleverness in discouraging physical revolution, 
which could only achieve temporary and inconsequential freedoms, 
and bolstering the government's authority over the private sphere. 
His argument is aimed at a conceptual revolution in the politics of 
communication. Instead of installing a new king on the throne, he 
installs new meanings into words and, thus, controls the ways in 
which we use those words. 
Conclusion 
In this reading of Kant's essay, I have tried to elucidate the 
mechanics and implications of what I take to be a subversive argu­
ment for free speech. In"An Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightemnent?" Kant is doing political philosophy politically -with 
a view to influencing the political state of affairs - and, believing that 
government must grant freedom of speech in order for enlighten­
ment to proceed and human history to progress, he has engineered 
his language to that end. Kant wants to convince us of this because 
the nature of reason, upon which the progress of the human race 
depends, is such that human society must be constituted in a certain 
way, namely, one which allows for free, public use of,reason - free, 
both legally and conceptually, of private, practical hindrances. What 
makes Kant's argument for the freedom of the public use of reason 
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different than other historical arguments for the freedom of speech 

is that it seeks to free only a certain kind of speech, and the criterion 

for this kind of speech is that it is produced by unprejudiced reason. 

The result is that, although this reason is supposedly Itfree," it is self­

regulating against all"authoritative" language from the government 

or the church. 

We have seen that Kant's opposing of the terms "public" and 
"private" is misleading, his use of the word "use" is dubious at best, 
and his matching of the words IIreason" and "private" is inconsistent 
with his own definition of reason. That freedom is associated with 
the public use of reason and lack of freedom is associated with the 
private use of reason is not justified because Kant grounds the 
antithesis'free' vs. 'not free' ina merely ostensible antithesis'public' 
vs. I private.' Kant is outwardly bolstering government and religious 
authority by championing strict obedience to themin their domains, 
but Kantis delicately redefining those domains so thatwhile the state 
and religion do not directly deal with truth, they depend on public 
free speech and the reasoning of philosophers like Kant to direct 
them. Thus Kant's public/private antithesis is a philosophically­
camouflaged strategy for normative, conceptual recommendations 
about political and religious authority. 
NOTES 
1 Originally published 12 December 1784 as "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
AufkUirung?" Berlinische Monatsschrift 4 (1784): 481-494. 
2The other was written by Moses Mendlessohn, originally published as "Ueber die 
Frage: Was heisst aufkHiren?" Berlinishe Monatsschrift 4 (1784): 193-200. 
3In "The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of 'Public' and ·Private.''' See Works 
Cited. 
" "Our investigation is ... a grammatical one/' Wittgenstein writes (Philosophical 
Investigations § 90). "Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by 
dearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of 
words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of 
expression in different regions of language." In order to relieve the philosophical 
confusion of such analogies (for example, the explanation of 'understanding' as 
I a mental process'), Wittgenstein shows that a word's meaning is simply its use 
in the language. Analogies are not the only causes of philosophical confusion. 
Kant's critical distinction between "the public use of reason" and lithe private use 
of reason" is, I believe, an example of a mistake (which I will call"ostensible 
antithesis") similar to that of misapplying analogies and properly dealt with by 
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grammatical investigation. 
S Garret Green comments that to Hamann, "Kant's distinction amounts to taking 
away with the left hand the freedom that he has just granted with the right. ... 
Kantian 'public' freedom is of little use to a civil servant like Hamann, who is 
'privately' enslaved in the kings service" (296,297). 
6 Kant's On the Conflict of the Faculties, written after the 1788 censorship edicts 
under Minister Woellner, is even dearer in its prescription of the government's 
job as not being concerned with reason or truth so that the philosopher's 
uncensored judgment is more needed. 
7 Foucault points out this paradox saying that Kant proposes "what might be 
called the contract of rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use 
of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, 
however, that the political principle that must be obeyed itself be in conformity 
with universal reason" (37). 
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